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DYNAMISM AND DEVELOPMENT:
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
POST-MAO CHINA
LINDA WONG AND KA-HO MOK
As China enters into the seventeenth year of reform, the success of its economic
policies has been widely recognised. This paper examines the theme of dynamism
and development by examining the link between economic growth and social
change. The first half of the paper discusses the social effects of rapid growth. In
the second half, an area example, that of the Pearl RiverDelta, is offered to illustrate
someofthe growth-relatedissuesandthe relationship with social development,with
particular reference to the question whether China has become a "risk society"
resulting from "rush-to" modernisation. The authors argue that rapid economic
growth may not bring about social progress, but rather, create ineffective social
management if development is not conceived from a holistic and comprehensive
perspective. Therefore, we must examine social development and economic growth
as interrelated phenomena, paying particular attention to complementarity in
public policy, social development, and market-related economic intervention.
Introduction
Sociologists of development have recently proposed the idea of
"risk society" to describe the pathological consequences of "rush-
to" modernisation. "Rush-to" modernisation refers to aprocess whereby
the principal goals of development are enhanced productivity and
rapid economic growth pursued at the expense of the development of
other aspects.1 To borrow Herbert Marcuse's phrase "one-dimen-
sional man", "rush-to" modernisation is tantamount to "one-dimen-
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sional development."2 As a corollary, such a "rush-to" modernisation
process produces exceedingly fast growth rates in the economic realm
but the distributional consequences of growth are generally ignored.
Not surprisingly, multiple kinds of social problems emerge, including
urban/rural disparity, widening income gap, galloping inflation, and
other socio-economic-political crises.3 Fundamentally concerned
with immediate tangible results, people pay little regard to the possible
negative repercussions that such development strategies and plans
would bring to society. This, in the extreme case, leads to the point
where people neither care for the future nor bear responsibilities for
what they have done. It is against such a context that Beck proposes
the idea of "risk society":
Every society has experienced dangers. But risk is the function
of a new order. It is not national, but global. It is rather
intimately connected with an administrative and technical
decision making process. Risks presuppose decision. These
decisions were previously undertaken with fixed norms of
calculability, connecting means and ends or causes and ef-
fects. These norms are precisely what risk society has rendered
invalid.4
In this regard, risk society is the product of incomprehensive
development plan adopted by irresponsible and short-sighted govern-
ment, the disaster of which is interwoven with cultural and institu-
tional realities.5 Without conceiving development from a holistic and
comprehensive perspective, people thus suffer from ineffective social
management.
Similarly, Midgley contrasts "development" and "distorted devel-
opment" by arguing that economic growth may not bring real social
progress, let alone realising the goal of achieving social welfare for all.
Differing from residualist-institutionalist approaches to social wel-
fare in that they are both subsidiary to the economy, the social
development approach which Midgley proposes tries to transcend the
residualist-institutionalist debate by emphasising the complicated
linkage between economic growth and social welfare, thus highlight-
ing the importance of social interventions which are compatible with
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economic development objectives.6 According to Midgley, the phe-
nomenon of "distorted development" is rather common in many parts
of the world because economic development has not been accompa-
nied by an attendant degree of social progress. Not surprisingly, rapid
economic modernisation has resulted in regional disparity, highly
skewed income distribution, poverty, deprivation, low health status,
insufficient housing, unemployment, oppression of women, and a
variety of social problems. Central to these social crises is not "the
absence of economic development but rather a failure to harmonize
economic and social development objectives, and to ensure that the
benefits of economic progress reach the population as a whole."7
Upon a deeper reflection on the essence of development, sociolo-
gists and economists have begun to accept the fact that economic
growth is only one dimension of development and that attention must
be turned to whether people really enjoy substantial improvement in
life quality.8 In the early 1990s, the acceptance of the notion of
"sustainable development" and the publication of a series of reports on
"human development" by the United Nations are highly indicative of
a renewed international concern for harmonising social policies with
measures designed to promote economic development. Taking a step
further, the United Nations convened the World Summit on Social
Development in 1995. After a period of neglect, social welfare is again
becoming an important issue for international discussion, thus show-
ing people's heightened awareness of the need for sustainable devel-
opment. In essence, social development is concerned with assessing
whether economic prosperity has achieved social purposes which are
principally concerned with human well-being.9 Hence, social devel-
opment embraces a large number of concerns. These are bound up with
economic change and development, in the process of which the state
should take active steps to ensure complementary policy provisions to
resolve problems or crises resulting from "rush-to" industrialisation.
Therefore, we must examine social development and economic growth
as interrelated phenomena, paying particular attention to
complementarity in public policy, social development, and market-
related economic intervention.
As China enters into the seventeenth year of reform, the success of
its economic policies has been widely recognised. This paper exam-
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ines the theme of dynamism and development by examining the link
between economic growth and social change. The first half of the
paper discusses the social effects of rapid growth. In the second half
of the paper, an area example, that of the Pearl River Delta, is offered
to illustrate some of the growth-related issues and the relationship with
social development, with particular reference to the question whether
China has become a "risk society" resulting from "rush-to" moderni-
sation.
Economic Reforms and the Emergence of a Market-Oriented
Society
Rapid Economic Growth
In the post-Mao era, the Chinese leadership has made great strides in
maximising economic growth to improve the living conditions of the
people. Promoting economic advancements by opening to the world
economy through an export-oriented strategy and simultaneously
developing a market economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
has accomplished its goal to transform China into a region which bears
the characteristics of a middle-income country in terms of social and
economic indicators.10 Herremarkable economic performance can be
gleaned from various indices. In 1978, China's Gross National Prod-
uct (GNP) was only 362.4 billion yuan. In 1994, it jumped to 4,491.8
billion yuan whereas the per capita GNP stood at 3,679 yuan, some ten
times over that in 1978.11 In terms of purchasing power parity, the
World Bank estimates that per capita GDP swelled from US$1,000 in
1978 to US$2,510 in 1994.12 Between 1978 and 1994, China's import
and export trade increased from US$20.6 billion to US$236.7 billion,
at 16.5 per cent per year.13 As far as consumption is concerned, there
has also been remarkable improvement for urban residents and people
living in the rural areas. Over the same period, per capita consumption
for the former increased from 405 yuan to 3,956 yuan; that for the latter
rose from 138 yuan to 1,087 yuan.14 Savings deposit of rural and urban
residents likewise increased from 21.1 billion yuan to 2151.9 billion
yuan.15 Some 200 million people were also lifted from absolute
poverty.16 The latest economic forecasts are very favourable, with all
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major economic indices showing a consistent trend of economic
development and increased productivity while the rate of inflation has
been held in check.17
The Evolution of Physical and Symbolic Marketing System
The economic indicators reveal that China has undergone substained
economic development. At the same time, they are also suggestive of
the emergence of physical and symbolic marketing systems. Accord-
ing to Sklair, physical marketing system is defined as the extent and
types of retail and other outlets for consumer goods and services.
Meanwhile symbolic marketing system refers to the extent and types
of marketing, principally but not exclusively advertising and mass
media, directed towards consumers.18
The policy of opening up that started in the late 1970s has had
considerable impact on the formation of a physical marketing system
in China.19 The most important changes in the distribution of goods
and services have been the mushrooming of rural markets particularly
in the suburbs of cities, the huge increase in the number of individuals
and families that have become traders, the growing demand for better
quality products, and the growth of multiple sources of goods for their
customers. People's enhanced consumption ability pointedly reveals
that a dynamic market has taken root in China. From the late 1970s
onwards there has been a pure quantitative expansion in the purchases
of the "Big Four" (bicycles, sewing machines, watches, and radios) as
the accumulated excess demand of the pre-reform years found an
outlet. More households, especially in the urban areas, began to
purchase new durable goods like low-priced record players and black
and white television sets. Other items, such as refrigerators and
washing machines, might cost between five and eight times an average
worker's monthly salary. Nevertheless, the "Big Four", the most
commonly aspired-to consumer items of the 1970s, have been re-
placed in the 1980s by refrigerators, washing machines, colour televi-
sion sets, and other expensive, perhaps "luxury", items.20 In recent
years, people's spending on food has been reduced while expenditure
on more consumer durables has increased, indicating a real enrich-
ment of people's living standards, particularly in the material do-
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main.21 Such a rapid growth in consumption and all-embracing
transformation of lifestyles confirm the formation of a physical
marketing system in the mainland.
In the Deng era, the south-eastern coast and most Chinese cities
have been opened up for foreign investment and trade. By the late
1980s, millions of Chinese have found work in export-processing
enterprises and millions more have started their own businesses.22 In
1994, township and village enterprises were employing 120.2 million
workers. During this period, the urban sector has been booming. Atthe
end of 1994,3.3 million persons were employed by private businesses,
while 12.3 million worked in the individual economy. In 1978, only
150,000 persons were self-employed.23 In addition to the registered
units, there are also millions of unregistered small family enterprises,
the development of which not only facilities the formation of an
"entrepreneurial class" but also increases the size of the private sector
in an exceedingly rapid way.24
Undoubtedly, the expansion of foreign investment further sup-
plies the impetus for the flourishing of a market economy in China.
Since 1983, the inflow of foreign capital to China has grown twenty-
eight times. With the translation of Chinese cultural values into
entrepreneurial acts, a great deal of economic dynamism is generated,
in particular by overseas Chinese businessmen.25 This influx of
foreign capital has given rise to a vast number of private and joint-
venture enterprises in the mainland. The growth in the number of firms
with foreign financial sources has been extremely rapid, increasing
from 1,392 in 1983, 15,997 in 1988, to 130,000 in 1992, producing
about 25 per cent of China's export and 9 per cent of the gross value
of industrial output.26 In 1994, foreign investments m China amounted
to US$33.7 billion, against a total fixed asset investment of 1,592.6
billion yuan.27 Obviously, continual foreign investments have driven
China's economy forward, making the country more economically
dynamic and productive.
Against a new market setting, more people are doing business and
entering the commercial field, especially after the official endorse-
ment of the socialist market economy in 1992. A wave of "jumping
into the sea" (going into business) evolved after Deng Xiaoping's tour
to the south during the Spring Festival of that year. From a base of
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150,000 persons in 1978, the number of urban and rural individual
industrialists, businessmen, private enterprise owners, and self-em-
ployed persons expanded to more than 44.68 million people in 1994.28
In addition to these registered private entreprenuers, university stu-
dents, intellectuals, local leaders, and ordinary workers have also
engaged in legal but unregistered and untaxed economic activities.29
Furthermore, urban collectives, village enterprises, rural township,
and firms with foreign investments have assumed a more important
role in China's economic sphere, accounting for a gross value of
industrial output from 20 per cent in 1979 to 51 per cent in 1992. By
1993, the non-state sector contributed 70 per cent of China's GDP.30
A recent estimate further suggests that over 95 per cent of consumer
goods are now circulated in the market, while only 20 categories of
production materials are under planned allocation.31 In view of such
a development, there has been wide agreement that the engine of
China's economic growth has been the non-state sector.32
Along with the emergence of a physical marketing system, a
symbolic marketing system has been developing in the post-Mao era.
From the mid-1960s until the late 1970s, there was practically no
product-advertising in China. Anderson documents the rebirth of the
advertising industry in the People's Republic of China since the
adoption of the open door policy.33 In order to promote their products,
the transnational corporations have created new consumption needs
by means of advertisement. Stross observes that advertising in China
has flourished rapidly, growing from 10 agencies (state-run) in 1980
to 7,000 (mostly non-state) in 1988.34These observations indicate that
a consumer revolution has occurred in the Deng era, giving rise to a
symbolic marketing system. The popularity of advertisements has
considerably influenced people's consumption as documented by
many studies.35 For instance, a study on consumption and consumer
behaviour in the Pearl River Delta reports a growing consciousness of
consumerism among citizens in the area.36 Furthermore, the tremen-
dously fast increase in people's consumption, together with an all-
embracing transformation of people's lifestyles seem to indicate that
consumerism may emerge as a dominant culture-ideology shared by
the residents living in mainland China.37 All in all, economic reforms
have not only given China's market economy a new life, but have also
significantly altered the social structure.
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Economic Prosperity and Changes in Social Configuration and
Social Stratification
Increased Opportunities for Social Mobility
As discussed earlier, the take-off of the market economy and the
continuous inflow of foreign capital have greatly improved people's
living standards and improved their life quality. More importantly,
economic modernisation has provided Chinese citizens with far more
opportunities for social mobility. Unlike during the Mao era when
social mobility was constrained because people were allocated to
different danweis (work units) without their consent or any chance of
job transfer,38 people in the post-Mao period have more job choices,
especially when a relatively free labour market has emerged since the
mid-1980s. The booming of private and joint-venture enterprises has
increased people's job mobility, a condition which would eventually
change the country's occupational structure.39 As some statistics
show, 90 per cent of job transferees have obtained their posts in
foreign-funded enterprises, rural and township enterprises, and pri-
vate enterprises, which offer higher renumeration and better welfare
benefits.40 Besides, the mushrooming of rural companies and the
increasing opportunities for peasants to change occupations are re-
markable. In 1993, more than 100 million out of 900 million people
with registered residence in the countryside moved to market towns
and cities, believing that better chances and job opportunities were
available there.41 These migrants have supplied rural industries with
abundant labour force, producing about 38 per cent of the gross value
of industrial output in 1993.42 Increased opportunities for social
mobility suggests a lessening of state control over people's move-
ment, work, and lifestyle.
Rise of the New Rich and Renegotiation of Power Relations
Real income increases have not only enriched the general public but
have also enabled them to renegotiate a new relationship with the state.
In 1994, the per capita income available for living expenses for urban
residents was 3,179 yuan and 1,221 yuan forrural dwellers, represent-
208
Economic Growth & Social Change in Post-Mao China
ing an increase of 35 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, over the
last year.43 At the end of 1995, a report by Workers' Daily estimated
that in urban areas 6 per cent of urban households could be classified
as "high-income" households (with an annual income between 30,000
and 100,000 yuan and assets worth 87,000 yuan) and 3 per cent could
be classified as "rich" households (annual income over 100,000 yuan
and assets worth 400,000 yuan).44 There are also a million millionaires
in the country.45 At the same time, people's savings deposited into
banks also expanded. In 1994, the savings of urban and rural house-
holds amounted to 2151.9 billion yuan; in 1978, it was only 21.1
billion yuan.46 These figures confirm that Chinese people have accu-
mulated more wealth and are earning much higher incomes. Against
this background, the rise of a new middle class is made possible. As
sociologists believe, accumulation of wealth can lead to a demand for
power redistribution.47 Now that Chinese people are growing richer
and are no longer dependent on the state for everything, they can have
more control over their lives, particularly when they now enjoy private
ownership. Instead of being stuck with a danwei for life, now Chinese
people have the choice of "exit."48 Having regained economic inde-
pendence, Chinese residents have more freedom to relocate them-
selves, to exchange products, and to determine their own lifestyles.49
Hence decreased dependence on the state has empowered people,
leaving them with more alternatives of life choice. As Lin Jing
observes, "[people] still have to deal with the government, but it is only
when they pay taxes or are checked for environmental damages and so
on."50 In this regard, the extent of the reach of the omnipresent state
into people's ordinary life is greatly reduced.
The rise of the new rich has given China's political scene a new
shape. These affluent businessmen and entrepreneurs exert influence
over both the economic realm and the political sphere, especially when
the local leaders are in need of entrepreneurs' financial support to
initiate more reforms and developmental projects. Thus an "alliance"
between the two parties is formed, the rise of which has affected the
power relations between the state and the "new elites."51 Yan de-
scribes such power relations as "a dual structure of social-economic
stratification that emerged in the countryside characterized by the
coexistence of bureaucratic rank order with a market-based economic
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class order."52 The formation of this "capital-bureaucrat" class may
eventually alter the existing social structure. In short, the growing
importance of these "elites" and the flooding of rural labourers into the
cities are the most visible signs of the restructuring of Chinese society,
depicting also a structural change in social stratification and in the
system of social status.53
Emergence of Relatively Autonomous Social Associations
In addition to the breakdown of the conventional, rigid, and closed
class system in the past, post-Mao Chinese society is also character-
ised by the emergence of voluntarily organised and autonomous social
associations and professional organisations. A large-scale survey
conducted among fifty Beijing universities in 1986 revealed a steady
growth of autonomous groups on the campuses. For example, from
1983 to 1986, there was a 58 per cent increase in the growth of
associations, with participation in such activities growing from 13,000
to 40,000.54 There are essentially five types of social associations in
China, namely, special interest groups like trade associations; corpo-
rations set up by provincial or local governments; professional soci-
eties; promotional groups such as the Chinese Society for Sports
Science; and finally a large motley collection of learned societies,
associations, foundations, research institutes, and clubs.55 As Liu
observes, "their [the voluntary organisations] flourishing since 1980
is yet another indication of the resurgence of natural man and commu-
nity in mainland China. The associations were a result of people freely
communicating and transacting with one another, and they repre-
sented the mainland Chinese people's rejection of the Communist
Party's centrally mobilized and socially segregated society."56 Even
though Chinese people's associational life was once restricted after
the June-Fourth Incident of 1989, the rise of a market economy has
unquestionably encouraged new forms of social engagement. The
relaxed socio-political environment has facilitated the proliferation of
karaoke bars, dance halls, and private restaurants, the development of
which has given Chinese citizens far more physical and social mobil-
ity and encouraged more social interaction beyond their work units.57
In spite of the fact that politically-motivated organisations were
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repressed in the post-June-Fourth era, social organisations of various
kinds such as professional bodies, interest groups, trade and cultural
associations have continued to flourish.58 Against such a context,
Sullivan suggests that the assertion of self-rule or independence from
the omnipresent state has become an unprecedented expression of
Chinese society.59 Putting the above-mentioned observations to-
gether, it suffices to argue that post-Mao China has become more
pluralistic in outlook. In the process, Chinese citizens have attempted
to change the conventional order and to renegotiate a new private/
public distinction.60
Economic Prosperity and Changes in the Socio-Cultural Realm
Plurality of Values and Fundamental Mentality Change
In addition to causing structural changes in post-Mao society, the
economic reforms have gone all the way to altering people's value
orientations. As the market economy develops, more people living in
China have internalised a new cluster of values, notably the accept-
ance of individual striving and market competition. As a result,
notions like personal interests, material incentives, differential re-
wards, economic efficiency, and market distribution are in ascend-
ance.61 In order to survive or get ahead, many people aspire to obtain
wealth through individual struggle. Thus, a practical philosophy
"either rich or poor, you are on your own" kind of mentality has
prevailed. Such a shift in value from socialist-idealism to market-
orientation has far-reaching significance for China's socio-political
development.62
Undeniably, the "open door" policy has exposed Chinese people
to the outside world, creating also a comparatively relaxed socio-
cultural environment. After the death of Mao, the state has failed to
create a compelling ideology to engage the trust of the people and thus
a self-legitimation crisis was reported.63 At the same time, Western
ideas appear to have made deep inroads in the political thought of
Chinese people, as suggested by a number of studies. For example,
Rosen observed that "a broad spectrum of the population seemed to
agree that Western thought could be beneficial to China."64 A national
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survey of Chinese political culture conducted in 19 89 by an independ-
ent group of young and middle-aged Beijing political scientists
reported that not only the highly educated and urbanised segment of
the population but also party and communist youth league members
adhered to Western ideas regarding assertion of individual choice.65
Another survey also found support for such Western values as free-
dom of expression and freedom of speech .66 Even after the crackdown
of the pro-democracy movement in 1989, a wide range of survey data
intimated that many students still admired Western democracy and
supported capitalism.67 Unlike Zheng's argument that Chinese people
in the mid-1980s were still ignorant of and ambivalent towards the
ideas of democracy, rights, and citizenship,68 Chinese residents are
now more aware of the importance of individual rights and democ-
racy. Different opinion surveys report the rise of individualism and the
weakening of collectivism. There is also a greater reluctance to pass
judgement on other people's "private matter." When asked: "What do
you think about people reading pornographic magazines?", many
respondents considered it a private and personal matter; only a small
proportion regarded it as detrimental to morality and society. There
was also wide endorsement for free choice in religion, thinking, and
life goals, with most believing that the state should not attempt to
interfere with the private life of citizens.69
With opportunities of listening to the Voice of America (VOA)
and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and reading West-
ern publications, Chinese people have become more dissatisfied with
the present situation, culminating in outbursts that are critical of the
government. This may explain why many Beijing residents supported
the slogans of democracy and showed sympathy to students' demon-
strations for freedom, democracy, science, and human rights during
the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989.70 More importantly, people
living in China have a habitual change after the 1989 student demon-
strations. Before the crackdown, most Chinese citizens used to listen
to the news and messages broadcasted by the CCP early in morning;
nowadays, few bother to tune in to such "official announcement."71
Additionally, scholars have openly initiated the discourse on "civil
society" from the mid-1980s onwards. No matter how divergent their
interpretations and views on civil society are, Chinese intellectuals'
212
Economic Growth & Social Change in Post-Mao China
conceptualisation of civil society has formative influence on China's
social and political life. This might in future alter the nature and
functions of existing institutions.72 Divorcing themselves from the
Marxist approach, Chinese intellectuals have become more aware of
the negative consequences of "mass society" and more critical of the
ostensible incoherence of the dominant official ideology. Such awak-
ening has also cultivated the ground for a plurality of thought in post-
Mao China.73 All this suggests that Chinese people have a fundamen-
tal mentality change, in that they are finding pluralistic value orientations
more acceptable. These changes take place not only in people's
thoughts but also in their behaviour, as revealed by their critical
attitude towards the socialist system and the domination of the CCP.74
Intensified Income Disparity and Social Inequality
There is no doubt that China has experienced exceedingly rapid
economic growth and that the people in general have enjoyed en-
hanced socio-economic opportunities after the initiation of economic
reform. What is also true is that there has been an increase in income
disparity and social inequality, which are concomitant consequences
of fast growth. As a result, some sectors of the population who are
unable to keep pace with rapid changes have lagged behind others.
Therefore, it is not surprising to hear people's complaints that years of
economic reforms have produced a number of privileged groups. The
CCP has stated publicly its intention of letting some people get rich
first, a process which gradually widens the gap between the rich and
the poor and gives rise to ill-feelings and jealousy among various
provinces and localities.75 Popular dissatisfaction with the income gap
is immediately apparent in popular rhymes which denounce the
inequality among different sectors. One such rhyme is particularly
effective in summing up the popular mood: "The reform has made
peddlers and those who live on the coast rich, but has impoverished
and deceived those who live on salaries... It has allowed young people
to be promoted, enriched peasants, and benefited senior cadres, while
causing workers to be more strictly controlled."76
Urban workers, intellectuals, and others on fixed salaries, having
encountered such an income disparity, have responded sharply. The
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preferential treatment granted to the coastal areas and special eco-
nomic zones has created millionaires while typical middle school
teachers and college professors remain underpaid, at levels worse than
those of the 1950s. For instance, the salaries of senior intellectuals
(including professors and researchers) dropped from a range of 345-
149 yuan in 1950s to 225-122 yuan in the 1980s. Qian Jiaju, a
prominent Chinese economist, argues that the real wage of the
intellectuals is only one-tenth of that in the 1930s;77 nor has there been
any improvement until recent years.78
The income differential between factory workers and intellectuals
is even wider when seniority is considered. Among all age groups,
middle-aged intellectuals are least advantaged when workloads and
incomes are compared. Similarly, the income gap between manual
and mental workers is very wide because households running indus-
trial and commercial businesses have enjoyed enormous increases in
their earnings. Thus the saying has emerged that "the one who writes
books is inferior to those who sell them" and "those who teach students
to play the piano are inferior to those who move pianos." What is even
worse, "those using their brains are inferior to those using razors, and
those who design atomic bombs are inferior to those who sell salted
eggs."79 Income gaps occur not only across occupations but also
within the same occupation, for instance, labourers working in private
and non-state enterprises. Not surprisingly, pay disparities between
different occupational groups increase workers' grivances. Witness-
ing many business people (such as the getihu) earning a huge amount
of money makes workers even angrier.
In the second half of the paper, we present a case study to illustrate
the complex relationship between economic growth and social
change.The example chosen is the Pearl River Delta, one of the fastest
growing and most prosperous areas in China. One of the authors,
Linda Wong, visited the area in 1988 and again in 1993. The data
reported below originated from these field trips.80
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Case Study of the Pearl River Delta
Rapid Economic Growth
The Pearl River Delta Open Economic Area (PRDOEA) covers an
area of 41,596 square metres. In 1993, it had a population of 20.56
million. The GDP of the PRDOEA was 226.5 billion yuan and the
GNP was 175.8 billion yuan. Between 1980 and 1993, the GDP and
GNP grew a staggering 7.1 and 6.5 times, respectively, with annual
growth rates of 17.5 per cent and 16.8 per cent.81 Such rates surpass
those of the Four Little Dragons (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and
South Korea) and rank among the highest in '.ne world. Most of this
growth can be accounted for by industrial ievelopment. Between
1980 and 1993, the annual increase in indu^Uial output was 21.7 per
cent. In money terms, the value of indusirial production for 1993 was
360.1 billion yuan, which was 11.8 times over 1980. Thus with only
31.2 per cent of Guangdong's population and 23.4 per cent of its land
area, the region accounted for 70.2 per cent of the province's GDP.82
To the outside world, the delta area is synonymous with economic
success, high incomes, and good living. At the same time, however,
rapid growth has resulted in inequality and rising social polarisation.
Alongside the opulent lifestyle of the rich and comfortable standards
of living for the general population, one can witness grave problems
afflicting migrant workers and the poor. Also visible are such prob-
lems as prostitution, gambling, drug abuse, and crime. The overall
scenario is thus a society with a galloping economy ("rush-to" mod-
ernisation) but inadequate attempts at managing the social effects of
economic change. The area can easily become a "risk society" if the
present state of affairs deteriorates.
In the delta area, the cities of Dongguan, Nanhai, Shunde, and
Zhongshan, touted as the Four Little Tigers of the Pearl River Delta,
are particularly outstanding. All four started off as rural counties and
have been upgraded to city status in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The prosperity of the four delta counties is not a new phenomenon.
Before 1949, their general affluence was well known. Situated close
to Guangzhou and Hong Kong, they have the advantages of excellent
transport, fertile soil, good climate, advanced agriculture, and skilful
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handicraft. Above all, they have had a long history of trade links with
southern China and abroad: 70 per cent of overseas Chinese originated
from here. After 1949, closure of the border and the pursuit of an
isolationist policy resulted in its ties with the outside being severed.
Considered a frontier region by Beijing, the delta area, and
Guangdong as a whole, was also denied much-needed state invest-
ment. For thirty years, the local economy stagnated until the reform
programme rekindled the flames of rebirth. The delta counties grasped
the opportunities provided by the new flexible policies and exploited
them to the full. Links with the outside world, especially with Hong
Kong, were quickly revived and vast sums of money were spent to
build roads, bridges, and physical infrastructure. Much of the money
was raised locally through levies and from outside investment. The
purpose was to prepare the area for an economic take-off.
Another asset is local leadership. Unlike their seniors in provincial
and municipal administrations, county leaders are recruited locally
and the delta counties are firmly committed to restore growth and
glory to their home base.83 Under such favourable conditions, the
economy soared. In agriculture, cash crops replaced rice cultivation;
aquatic products and livestock rearing also boosted rural incomes.
Building, transportation, and trade boomed. Above all, rural industries
provided the lion's share of local income. Since the reforms began, the
number of township and village enterprises increased by 35 per cent
or more per year.
The social and economic characteristics of the tigers are rather
similar, as shown in Table 1. After the initiation of economic reform,
their economies have experienced astounding growth. By the late
1980s they have become highly urbanised and industrialised. None-
theless, the four cities have followed slightly different trajectories of
industrial development. Among the four, Shunde's strength lies in its
large and modern township enterprises. Zhongshan has more large-
scale state enterprises which have been technologically upgraded.
Dongguan is famous for its export-processing. Finally Nanhai prides
itself on simultaneous growth on all fronts: at the municipal, district,
township, village, joint household, and household levels.84
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Social Stratification and Lifestyles
The general affluence of the region is obvious to any visitor. The area
has good roads, water, and electricity. Imposing new factories line the
major transport routes. New residences, two to three stories high, dot
the countryside. Everywhere farmland and hills have been flattened
for new construction. In town centres, shops are doing roaring busi-
ness. Imported cars outnumber domestic vehicles. Officials, company
bosses, and managers are chauffeured around in air-conditioned
comfort. Among cadres, the higher the rank, the more luxurious the
issue. Even low-ranking officials wear pagers; their seniors carry
mobile telephones to ease communication.
Eating is big business in the four cities. The delta has had a long
and distinguished culinary tradition. Indeed the best Cantonese cook-
ing originated in such places like Shunde and Panyu in the delta.
According to our field observations and interviews with local inform-
ants, business in most restaurants is brisk. Their fish tanks hold all
kinds of delicacies from China and abroad. Most eateries boast about
their Hong Kong chefs, serve Hong Kong-style cuisine, and charge
Hong Kong prices. The big spenders are mostly firm managers,
business owners, and officials. Locals say between 70-80 per cent of
restaurant bills, which can easily run into thousands of yuan per table,
are picked up by people with expense accounts. For truly favoured
guests, a few bottles of XO and even Louis XIII fine cognac, the latter
costing more than 8,000 yuan each, are offered. Such hospitality is all
the more surprising since many of those signing the cheques, apart
from business owners, are nominally earning around 1,000 to 2,000
yuan a month. What follows after a sumptuous meal may be karaoke
singing or entertainment in one of the areas's teaming nightspots.
How much the elites earn is a secret. The area has numerous
millionaires, and quite a number of them are reputed to be worth over
100 million yuan. Local officials also like to boast about the wealth in
the area. Without much promting, cadres can off-handedly give the
names of a number of super-wealth bosses. On the whole, under-
reporting of incomes is widely assumed. The rich live in lavish
apartments or villas with every kind of home comfort. In Zhongshan,
a city known for its building materials, people vie for the number of
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ensuite bathrooms in their residence. Opulence has also perverted
social morals. According to local informants, some bosses are said to
have kept mistresses. In Dongguan, such women have a penchant for
fancy pet dogs. To avoid misunderstanding, families with good
standing tend not to keep such animals however much they would like
them. The rich are particularly eager to give their children the best
education they can buy. In Guangdong, some forty expensive private
schools have sprung up in recent years.85 One such school in Guangzhou
asks for 300,000 yuan debenture for each pupil admitted; another
school in Zhuhai demands 250,000 yuan. The response has been
overwhelming. Wealthy parents in the four cities are only too happy
to pay the same or more if amenities are set up locally to spare them
the trouble of ferrying their children over long distances.
Average standards in the delta are more comfortable than most
parts of China. Both officials and ordinary citizens say that the
majority of local people live well with homes fitted out with modern
electrical appliances, for which the region is famous. Indigenous
residents hold the best jobs; true locals mostly work as supervisors and
managers in factories and trading firms. The more enterprising operate
their own business or form joint ventures, thanks to their good
connections and access to resources. In the early years of the reform,
there was some emigration from the area, mostly to Hong Kong. But
as the local economy prospers and living standards improve, such
outflows stopped. Some emigrants actually returned to start their own
business, bringing with them newly learnt skills, business links, and
capital earned from their stint abroad.
Native peasant households also do well. Their greatest asset is
land, which can be rented out, used for factory premises, or sold. In the
past, delta people were highly successful farmers but now few house-
holds work the land. If they do so at all, the heavy work is done by hired
hands from outside the area. In Shunde, for example, local cadres
happily pronounce that draught animals are no longer used on the land,
and that even its traditional silk weaving is now exported to other hilly
counties. More useful indicators of general living standards are
income data. From official statistics, the four tigers are doing excep-
tionally well. In 1994, the average per capita income for urban
residents in China was 3,179 yuan and the per capita rural net income
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was 1,221 yuan.86 In the four cities, the figures were double the
national average.
The situation of migrant workers is a lot less enviable. Reliable
figures on the migrant population are not available. One estimate is 2.5
million87 but this number may have missed out many unregistered
transients. The non-local population may be as high as half the
registered population, with Dongguan having the most. Not surpris-
ingly, these outsiders enjoy a lower social standing than permanent
dwellers. This is not to suggest that they are a homogeneous group. At
the top, there are people with prized expertise who have been recruited
to work in local enterprises. These include university graduates,
engineers, seasoned managers, well-qualified headmasters, school
teachers, and technical personnel. The positions are advertised nation-
ally and successful applicants are amply rewarded with high salaries,
nice apartments, and generous perks. In Dongguan, Houjie Township
government paid headmasters 1,800 yuan and teachers 900 yuan per
month when Wong conducted field interviews there in 1993. Indeed,
with the lure of good pay and benefits, the area has attracted a lot of
skills and talents from all over the country, even professors, scientists,
and graduates from famous universities in the north.
Ordinary labourers, who can be had by the truck load, hardly
receive preferential treatment. The large supply of workers makes the
local labour market very much a buyer's market. Most of the migrant
workers are young, first-generation industrial workers with an agri-
cultural background. They are mostly engaged as temporary labour-
ers. Men tend to be concentrated in heavy construction and harzardous
job while women are found mostly in rural industries and tertiary
services. Monthly wages for factory workers vary according to the
work they do but commonly range between 350 and 500 yuan a month.
Temporary staff are usually housed in company dormitories. From
first-hand observation, the living conditions in many quarters are
appalling, with row upon row of beds crowded into barrack-like rooms
offering little or no privacy. Some of the better factories have common
recreational areas. Most do not have such facilities.
Working conditions for many migrant labourers (min gong) leave
much room for improvement. Working hours are long. Shifts often to
twelve hours a day, six or mostly seven days a week, are quite
common.88 Despite official restrictions on overtime work, forced
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overtime is routine. What is more, temporary personnel can be fired at
any time. Abuse of workers' rights, for example withholding of wages,
late payment, corporal punishment, sexual harrassment, and so on has
been widely reported, especially in firms under foreign ownership.89
Under Chinese law, each enterprise, including foreign investment
enterprise, must establish a trade union. In practice, many private and
foreign-owned companies reject union activities altogether, under the
connivance of local cadres too eager to lure and retain overseas
capitalists. Enteprises are supposed to pay at least a minimum wage.
In reality, some firms just pay the bare minimum while others do not
even meet the minimum standard. Indeed, low pay, especially in the
light of high inflation, has prompted a number of strikes in foreign-
owned enterprises in Zhuhai and elsewhere in the delta.
Equally worrying is the prevalence of industrial accidents. Some
of these, like the Shenzhen Qingshuihe Dangerous Goods Depot Fire
on August 5, 1993 and the Zhuli Toy Factory Fire on November 19,
1993, are particularly notorious.90 According to a government release,
during January to August 1993, 11,600 workers died in industrial
accidents, representing a 113 per cent increase over the same period
in 1992. Among the accidents, fires accounted for the largest number.
In the first ten months of 1993, there were 28,200 factory fires
resulting in 1,480 deaths, 51,340 casualties, and property losses of 845
million yuan.91
The frequency of these accidents calls for sobre reflection. First,
most plant operators and local governments have been too zealous
chasing after increased productivity and profits but are neglectful of
industrial safety. Foreign-owned enterprises are said to be particularly
culpable as they tend to be shortsighted and callous over safety
matters. Second, management systems, including laws, regulations,
and administration, have not kept pace with the rapid expansion of
industrial development. This is especially true in the Pearl River Delta.
Third, implementation of work safety and worker protection rules
have been amiss. Very often, investors find it more profitable to bribe
officials than to comply with the rules. In Guangdong, after scoring a
dismal record of policy failures, safety regulations have been tight-
ened. In theory, strict enforcement would eliminate the sources of
most tragedies. However, in practice, lax administration has resulted
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in repeated occurences of infringements. Finally, the lack of safety
consciousness among workers and their readiness to put up with
unreasonable working conditions also make them easy prey to unscru-
pulous bosses and managers. Their lack of power and organisation, as
well as inadequate trade union representation, means that labour
grievances are not heeded by local officials. In fact, some cadres are
not above breaking the laws themselves as government departments
"jump into the sea." A case in point is the Qingshuihe explosion when
the public security bureau, which is responsible for fire prevention and
fire fighting, is one of the owners of the dangerous goods depot which
failed to install proper safety precautions.
Indeed the lack of protection or even flagrant exploitation of
migrant workers is one of the blackspots in the area's economic
miracle. Min gong are generally regarded as dispensable people. They
are tolerated only because they are believed to be useful. As soon as
their utility vanishes, they will not be welcome by the local commu-
nity. Annually, the delta area churns over the pool of outside labour
supply. Older workers do not have their contracts renewed when their
dexterity falls and new recruits are engaged to take their place.
Despite the area's wealth, poverty is far from extinct. Civil affairs
officials readily admit to the presence of poor people in the midst of
affluence. Most of the poor are found in the hilly terrain where
transport is more difficult. As far as individual households are con-
cerned, the major reasons for financial hardship include sickness,
disabilities, and death in the family. People with low levels of
intelligence also do badly as they fail to possess adequate skills for
employment. Those who have no family, no ability to work, or no
means of livelihood (the "three nos") are at the bottom of the pile. Yet,
the four cities have no official poverty line.
For the urban poor, the average relief rate for a single person in
1993 was 120 yuan a month, which was one-quarter to one-third of
the local average wage. For destitute peasants, assistance varied
widely across localities. The more common rate was between 500 and
600 yuan per person per year, or 40 and 50 yuan a month in 1993.
Government departments do not always have accurate information
about the needy. Three reasons contribute to this. First, rural relief is
funded by villages and towns, not by the government whose interven-
tion is resisted by local communities. Second, data collection is not
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conducted on a regular basis. Third, welfare assistance has not been
revised to keep pace with improved living standards and inflation. In
private, welfare cadres complain about their lack of clout in the
municipal government. Like their charges, they are sometimes treated
as second-line supplicants and are shunned by top leaders for their
propensity to ask for more money for the poor.
From the field surveys conducted in 1988 and 1993, the number of
aged persons eligible for the "five guarantees" (food, clothing, hous-
ing, health care, and burial) in the sample cities has either remained
stable or actually decreased, as shown in Table 2. There are three
possible explanations for this phenomenon: first, there may be fewer
destitute homeless elderly. Second, it is conceivable that the authori-
ties have not kept accurate statistics. Third, local communities have
not allowed more needy persons to be supported at public expense.
Table 2
Old Age Support in the Four Tigers
Number of Five Guarantee Persons
Dongguan
Nanhai
Shunde
Zhongshan
Number of Aged Homes (and Residents)
Dongguan
Nanhai
Shunde
Zhongshan
Maintenance Standard for Residents
(yuan per person per month)
Dongguan
Nanhai
Shunde
Zhongshan
1988
1995
2085
2002
2456
22 (390)
16 (399)
13 (340)
13 (190)
45
NA
45
NA
1993
1949
NA
1795
2466
8(NA)
29 (900+)
18 (554)
20 (370)
120
120
100-120
100
Source: 1988 and 1993 field interviews.
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Local agencies are either reluctant or unable to suggest which of these
are more relevant. It is however not unreasonable to assume that the
second situation is the most likely.
Table 2 also shows that, with the exception of Dongguan, the other
three tigers have expanded facilities and taken care of more elderly
indigent people; the amount of maintenance payment has also in-
creased from about 40 yuan per person per month to between 100 to
120 yuan per person per month. Nevertheless, these sums are rather
miserly when compared to average income. As of 1993, none of the
cities, reputedly among the richest in the country, met the recommen-
dation of the Ministry of Civil Affairs to set up one care facility for
local old people in each township or administrative village.
Regarding support for the disabled, the four cities have substan-
tially increased the number of welfare factories, as seen in Table 3.
Table 3
Welfare Factories in the Four Tigers
(and their disabled employees)
1988 1993
Dongguan
Nanhai
Shunde
Zhongshan
5 (542)
8 (330)
25 (381)
1(51)
11(340)
22(1100)
56 (1600)
39 (467)
Source: 1988 and 1993 field interviews.
In Dongguan and Shunde, the rise was more than double, and in
Nanhai and Zhongshan the expansion was even greater. In compari-
son, the intake of disabled employees has been less impressive. In
1993, Dongguan actually had fewer disabled persons performing
welfare production work than five years previously despite the in-
crease of unit number. The only plausible explanation is that disabled
staff have been laid off, a practice that has become more common in
other places. What usually happens is that disabled employees are
"retired" with a monthly allowance and their places are then filled by
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able-bodied temporary workers. Officials are reluctant to divulge the
size of the temporary workforce beyond saying that their numbers
fluctuate with job orders. What is known is that such workers have
become the mainstay of front-line staff in these factories. Indeed the
last few years have seen welfare enterprises encountering more acute
competition. Such units are fighting an increasingly uphill battle to
stay afloat. Replacing disabled staff by more able workers who can be
summarily dismissed enables firms to cut costs. On the other hand, the
government has difficulty safeguarding the jobs of the disabled since
the majority of units are operated by the non-state sector. By the same
token, civil affairs officials now find it harder to persuade people to
start welfare production. Again, the four cities have not achieved the
guideline of having one project in each township or village as stipu-
lated by the Civil Affairs Ministry. Dongguan's record seems to be
poorer than the others.
Welfare officials are acutely aware that their achievements in
social welfare lag behind the region's economic success. The state of
welfare assistance was paltry in 1988 and after five years of breathtak-
ing economic growth, the welfare gap seems more pronounced than
ever. Among the four tigers, Nanhai is the most determined to speed
up its welfare programme. Between 1993 and 1994 its welfare
department aimed to set up one home for the destitute, one welfare
factory for the disabled, and one welfare fund for every village and
township. The others seem less committed. However, all four cities
have plans to build a children's home to cater for the increasing
number of abandoned and handicapped children and a large multi-
purpose facility to assist the old and the needy.
What happens in welfare provisions in the four tigers parallels the
welfare record of Guangdong as a whole - a significant gap between
its economic ability and welfare performance. The lesson to be drawn
is that affluence need not breed generosity. The will to improve the
plight of the poor is as instrumental as possessing the means to do so.
Social Problems
Besides unmet needs, a number of social problems has become
increasingly apparent. Leading the list of social maladies is prostitu-
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tion. Although local statistics are not available, the four tigers are said
to have the highest concentration of prostitutes in Guangdong. In
many town centres and along trunk roads, bars, night-clubs, "hair
salons", massage parlours, "love hotels", and sauna baths abound,
most of which supply women for "personal services". Passers-by are
sometimes amazed by the bold approach of such operators. Around
the entrances to hotels and discos, attractive young women, many
from outside the province, plead to be taken on as companions.
Observant pedestrians cannot fail to pick out discreet signs on lamp-
posts and doorways that advertise cures for venereal diseases; nor can
anyone miss the piles of pornographic materials sold in book shops
and street corners.
The authorities are naturally concerned. Anti-vice campaigns are
both regular and frequent. But with a thriving market of willing
customers and sellers, prostitution and pornography remain a constant
headache and embarrassment. Some cynics have even advanced the
view that such evils are inevitable consequences of prosperity. The
assumption is not only that such tastes have to be tolerated but also to
be catered for. Allegedly, these lubicate business and "improve the
investment environment". Some local officials have even openly
discussed the feasibility of having "red light districts" under the guise
of better mangement. In 1994, the brazen nature of the so-called "no
prostitutes, no prosperity" theory (wu chang bufu lun) prompted an
angry rebuttal from Li Tieying, State Councillor responsible for
cultural affairs.92 Moralists are equally shocked. Most local people
remain resigned to the proliferation of such activities.
For law-abiding citizens, the major concern is crime. There are no
data to ascertain the size of the problem. In private, local residents and
drivers admit to being fearful of riding out-of-town coaches because
of the alarming number of road robberies. The authorities are also
worried about drug trafficking and abuse. Besides, gambling seems to
be a new craze. On the bravado of local gamblers, a number of
informants offer this vignette - bets that change hands are often not
counted; instead stakes are gauged on the thickness of the banknotes.
Reportedly, huge sums change hands in many a game. Big gamblers
are also big spenders. Indeed, in the delta area, conspicuous consump-
tion is readily visible.93 Consumerism and materialism are apparent
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everywhere. Local residents, while relishing their affluence, are rather
anxious about the erosion of public morals. The general consensus is
that the social health of the area has deteriorated alongside with, or
even because of, prosperity. Most believe that the situation will get
worse and that there is nothing much that the government can do.
Conclusion
All in all, the introduction of economic reform in post-Mao China has
considerably improved the lot of the people. Concurrently it has also
created great disparities and generated many social problems. The
story of the Pearl River Delta is a good case in point. More than any
other place in China, there the transition from planned to market
economy is far advanced. Obviously, the process of modernisation is
far from complete. One sign is that notwithstanding its stunning
economic progress, social developments have scarcely kept pace.
Attempts at social management have also been less than effective. In
the delta area as well as in China as a whole, economic reform has
enriched many citizens. Yet, it is doubtful whether reform has achieved
the goal of common prosperity. The experience of the world suggests
that economic advancement alone does not necessarily improve the
quality of people's lives. What is more fundamental, development is
not merely a matter of economic growth but the advancement of
human well-being. Without social improvements, cultural enrichment
and ideological enlightenment, there is no guarantee that people's
lives can be really improved. Perhaps of the most relevance to the state
is that when compatible policy reforms and institutional strategies fail
to keep pace with rapid socio-economic change, social development
will be far from balanced. Such lessons are important to China. At the
present time the People's Republic of China is confronting many
social, economic, and political problems closely related to imbalanced
development. To the extent that these are allowed to gnaw at the fabric
of society, social instability and moral decay will become the cost of
growth. It may be risky to conclude that China, or the Pearl River
Delta, has become a "risk society". But in order to save China from
deteriorating into such a state, a lot needs to be done to ensure that real
development, including social development, occur to improve the
well-being of 1.2 billion people in the world.
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